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Abstrak 
Artikel ini bertujuan melakukan eksaminasi pada tantangan yang dijumpai oleh economic 
community dalam melakukan harmonisasi. Tujuan penulisan ini agar dapat menjadi 
pertimbangan bagi ASEAN dalam melakukan harmonisasi hukum persaingan usaha negara-
negara anggotanya. Pada studi sebelumnya menyatakan bahwa kemungkinan dilakukannya 
harmonisasi hukum persaingan usaha di level regional adalah dengan menyesuaikan hukum 
pada negara-negara anggota dengan tujuan meminimalisir konflik hukum jika terjadi kasus 
lintas batas. Namun demikian, pada faktanya terdapat perbedaan yang sangat mendasar 
untuk dilakukan harmonisasi. Perbedaan-perbedaan tersebut menimbulkan permasalahan 
dalam praktik harmonisasi yang dialami oleh Uni Eropa maupun Amerika ketika terjadi 
kasus yang sifatnya lintas batas yurisdiksi nasional mereka, sehingga dapat mengambil 
hikmah dari kasus-kasus tersebut. Artikel ini difokuskan pada dua area pembahasan, yaitu: 
perbedaan dalam merespon market behaviour dan budaya hukum. Dari kedua hal tersebut 
ada beberapa pelajaran yang dapat diambil oleh ASEAN ketika melakukan harmonisasi 
persaingan usaha negara-negara anggotanya.  
Kata-kata Kunci: HukumPersaingan Usaha; ASEAN; Harmonisasi. 
 
Abstract 
This article aims to examine the challenges encountered by the economic community while 
harmonizing their domestic laws. The purpose of this paper is to provide consideration for 
ASEAN to harmonize the competition laws among its member states. Some previous studies 
had confirmed that the possibility of harmonizing competition law at the regional level might 
happen if the member states could adjust their domestic laws. It could minimize the legal 
conflicts when cross-border cases occurred. However, there are fundamental differences to 
form the harmonization. Such differences had created practical problems in the European 
Union and the United States when the cross-border cases occurred. This article focuses on 
two areas of discussion, namely: differences of treatment to market behavior and differences 
in legal culture. From these areas, there are several lessons that ASEAN could take when 
harmonizing the competition law of its member countries. 
Keywords: Competition Law; ASEAN; Harmonization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
ASEAN clearly stated its position 
as an economic community (AEC) in 
2015 to create a single ASEAN market 
and production base, to make ASEAN 
more dynamic and competitive with 
other economic regions, to facilitate 
free movement of goods/services and 
free movement of skilled labor, also, to 
facilitate free movement of capital and 
investment.1 
One of the imminent problems 
that the AEC must face is the current 
lack of a common competition 
provision. The AEC needs a policy that 
represents a prerequisite for free trade 
and for keeping the market free from 
restrictive business conduct. Common 
regulation is a requirement for 
establishing a regional single market.2 
Since competition law is the central 
instrument of free trade, it has a major 
role in the process of liberalization 
within ASEAN to ensure the ASEAN 
market is accessible widely for new 
entrants and to prevent the internal 
market from anticompetitive conduct.3 
ASEAN’s commitment to help the 
economic integration through the AEC 
becomes the main reason to encourage 
                                                          
1 Siow Yue Chia, The ASEAN Economic Community: Progress, Challenges, and Prospects', A World 
Trade Organization for the 21st Century (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 14. 
2 Candra Irawan, 'Legal Harmonization in ASEAN Economic Communities (Looking for the Best 
Legal Harmonization Model)' (2018) 3 (2) University Of Bengkulu Law Journal 134. 
3 Lawan Thanadsillapakul, 'The Harmonization of ASEAN Laws and Policy and Economic 
Integration' (2004) 3 Uniform Law Review 479, 480. 
4 Damien Neven and Paul Seabright, 'Trade Liberalization and the Coordination of Competition 
Policy' in William S Comanor, Akira Goto and Leonard Waverman (eds), Competition Policy in the 
Global Economy: Modalities for Co-operation (Routledge 2005) 334-355. 
5 Caroline Cauffman and Niels J Philipsen, 'Who Does What in Competition Law: Harmonizing the 
Rules on Damages for Infringements of the EU Competition Rules?' Maastricht European Private 
Law Institute Working Paper 19/2014, 15 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2520381> accessed 7 March 2020. 
6 EU experienced such issues where legal diversity leads to legal unpredictability due to unequal 
legislation and provisions in EU market. See Helmut Wagner, Economic Analysis of Cross-Border 
Legal Uncertainty: the Example of the European Union (Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss, FernUniv. 
2004) 3. 
7 Oliver Budzinski, 'Lead Jurisdiction Concepts: Prospects and Limits for Rationalizing 
International Competition Policy Enforcement' (2018) 18 (2) Global Economy Journal;Oliver 
Budzinski, Towards Rationalizing Multiple Competition Policy Enforcement Procedures: The Role of 
Lead Jurisdiction Concepts (Universitätsbibliothek Ilmenau 2015) 2. 
the harmonization of competition law 
within ASEAN by endeavoring to 
introduce national competition law 
and policy by 2015. The claim that 
economic integration enhances the 
urgent call for harmonization of 
competition law relies on the argument 
that anti-competitive conduct across 
jurisdictions will increase.4 Another 
argument favoring the harmonization 
is different laws in the respective 
member states and a great number of 
other legal provisions impose different 
costs on the market.5 Legal diversity 
within the ASEAN will increase the 
transaction costs of cross-border 
economy transaction sand discourages 
firms from engaging in such 
transactions.6 
These conflicts are leading to a 
growing consciousness in the ASEAN 
economic community. Diversities in 
competition law among the member 
states within AEC will enhance cross-
border economic transactions.7 Should 
the harmonization initiative be the 
answer to the legal uncertainty issue? 
What are the problems that ASEAN will 
be dealing with when they attempt to 
harmonize the national competition 
law  of    the   members?    These    are 
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precisely the core questions of this 
study. Hence, this paper begins a 
discussion by describing the function 
of harmonization in the ASEAN 
Economic Community in Part 2. This 
will be followed by an evaluation of the 
cross-border competition issues in Part 
3 whereby it will not only address the 
question of whether the harmonization 
is desirable or not, but it will also 
examine the problems of the 
harmonization that are likely to be 
solved. Part 4 concludes. 
Several studies have incredibly 
analyzed the positive side of the 
harmonization of competition laws to 
bridge the gap in the economic 
community. For example, Jurgita 
Malinauskaite who explored the 
harmonization of competition laws in a 
global context and offered the possible 
options for dealing with issues among 
the involved states,8 Jusoh, et al.,9 and 
Lee and Fukunaga10 who observed the 
same thing. This paper highlights the 
possible legal issues that arise in 
ASEAN members by examining the 
experiences of the European Union 
(EU) or country involved in regional 
trade agreements, such as the US. 
                                                          
8 Jurgita Malinauskaite, 'Harmonisation in Competition Law in the Context of Globalisation' (2010) 
21 European Business Law Review 369. 
9 Sufian Jusoh, Yose Rizal Damuri, and Intan Murnira Ramli, 'Regional Regulatory Coherence in 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations: The Case of Competition Law and Intellectual 
Property' in Intal P. and Mari Pangestu (eds), Integrated and Connected Seamless ASEAN 
Economic Community (ERIA 2019), 127-171. 
10 Cassey Lee and Yoshifumi Fukunaga, 'ASEAN Regional Cooperation on Competition Policy' (2014) 
35 Journal of Asian Economics 77. 
11 Simon Pettman, Standards Harmonisation in ASEAN: Progress, Challenges, and Moving Beyond 
2015 (ERIA Discussion Paper Series 2013) 1-2. 
12 Legal Transplantation refers to legal systems unilaterally amend their internal rules and adopt 
rules that are more frequently observed in other legal systems. Legal unification is defined as 
where countries agree to replace national rules and adopt a unified set of rules chosen at the 
interstate level. See Joanne Wong, 'On Legal Harmonisation Within ASEAN' (Singapore Law 
Review, 2013) <http://www.singaporelawreview.com/juris-illuminae-entries/2015/on-legal-
harmonisation-within-asean> accessed 7 March 2020. 
13 Michal S. Gal, 'Regional Competition Law Agreements: An Important Step for Antitrust 
Enforcement' 2010 60 (2) The University of Toronto Law Journal 239.  
14 Huong Ly Luu, 'Regional Harmonization of Competition Law and Policy: An ASEAN Approach' 
(2012) 2 (2) Asian Journal of International Law 291. 
15 Thanadsillapakul, 'The Harmonization of ASEAN Laws and Policy and Economic Integration 
Perspective' (n 3) 480. 
Rather than seeing the whole area of 
competition law, this paper prefers to 
focus on two specific areas: the 
different treatment of market behavior 
and the legal culture. 
DISCUSSION 
ASEAN and Harmonization 
Demands for a more 
comprehensive harmonization of 
competition law in ASEAN member 
states assume that legal diversity has 
caused transaction costs and lowers 
economic trade and welfare by creating 
legal uncertainty. The implementation 
of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
could be an example.11 Legal 
harmonization is best suited to the 
peculiarities of the region and to 
ASEAN itself rather than legal 
transplantation of legal unification.12 
Some studies acknowledged that 
competition law as the fundamental 
principle of regional economic 
integration and harmonization could 
bring many benefits to the countries 
which are involved.13 The latest 
research findings such as Luu,14 
Thanadsillapakul,15    and    Malinaus- 
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kaite,16 confirmed that competition law 
harmonization is essential for the 
existence of an economic community.17 
Regional competition law may reduce 
some significant obstacles to 
competition law enforcement in 
developing jurisdictions.18 In a 
common market, competition law has 
the potential to further the goal of the 
integrated market.19 Integrating 
competition policy is valuable as a 
regional agreement has a wider 
opportunity to assist the regions in 
achieving deeper economic integration 
than the international system could 
achieve.  
A significant benefit offered by 
regional competition policy is that it 
eliminates barriers to trade and it 
makes sure the member countries to 
enforce their domestic competition 
laws to ensure the access of firms.20 To 
put it in other words, common 
standardized rules of competition 
policy reduce entry barriers to the 
economic community.  
ASEAN adopted the EU style 
harmonization and the positive 
expectations have been raised.21 EU 
has succeeded in achieving 
harmonization of competition law 
                                                          
16 Malinauskaite, 'Harmonisation in Competition Law in the Context of Globalisation' (n 8) 376.  
17 OECD, 'Challenges/Obstacles Faced By Competition Authorities In Achieving Greater Economic 
Development through the Promotion of Competition' (OECD, 2004) <http://www.oecd. 
org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/25500484.pdf> accessed 13 December 
2019. 
18 Gal, 'Regional Competition Law Agreements: An Important Step For Antitrust Enforcement' (n 
13). Also, see Phanomkwan Devahastin Na Ayudhaya, 'ASEAN Harmonization of International 
Competition Law: What Is the Most Efficient Option' (2013) 2 (3) International Journal of 
Business, Economics and Law 1. 
19 Lee and Fukunaga, 'ASEAN Regional Cooperation on Competition Policy' (n 10).  
20 Gal, 'Regional Competition Law Agreements: An Important Step For Antitrust Enforcement' (n 
18).  
21 Barbora Valockova, 'EU Competition Law: A Roadmap for ASEAN?' EU Centre Working Paper  
25/2015, 2 <https://hdl.handle.net/10356/81660> accessed 11 March 2020.  
22 Lee McGowan, 'Theorising European Integration: Revisiting Neo-Functionalism and Testing its 
Suitability for Explaining the Development of EC Competition Policy?' European Integration 
Online Papers 4-5 <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/ index.php/eiop/article/view/2007_003a/50> 
accessed 7 March 2020. 
23 Rafaelita M Aldaba, Emerging Issues in Promoting Competition Policy in the APEC and ASEAN 
Countries ( PIDS Discussion Paper Series 2008) 14.  
through the supranational authority.22 
Meanwhile, ASEAN members are still 
struggling with their efforts to stabilize 
their new-born competition laws. Some 
gaps exist among the member states in 
their levels of enforcement. Diversity in 
the national levels of enforcement may 
not only harm the national market but 
it also may impede the free flow of trade 
across the ASEAN. Therefore, 
competition law authorities must 
establish the proper role of competition 
policy.  
Competition Law Cross-Border 
Issues 
Enforcing competition policy in 
economic integration has resulted in 
some convergences of practice across 
competition law jurisdictions. These 
convergences include bridging gaps 
between developing and developed 
countries.23 The convergence of 
practice from competition policy 
harmonization occurred across these 
areas: cartels, mergers, and vertical 
restraints. 
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Treatment of Market Behaviour 
Export Cartel Agreements 
A potential barrier that ASEAN 
needs to consider is the differences in 
the treatment of market behavior. 
Such a barrier appears in several anti-
competitive conduct provisions such 
as export cartels, vertical restraint, 
and merger policy. The different 
treatments of anti-competitive conduct 
may affect trade relations between 
countries. Export cartels are deemed 
as forms of anti-competitive conduct 
since those arrangements create 
monopolies in the relevant market.24 
Those forms of conduct are 
commonly regarded as acceptable and 
permitted, while the domestic cartels 
are forbidden. It is understood that 
domestic arrangements may harm 
local consumers, while export cartels 
can be beneficial.25 The commonly 
given justification is that export cartels 
will help firms to cope with 
international trade barriers, reduce the 
extra costs of exports, and refuse the 
power of international buying cartels.26 
Some countries exempt export 
cartels from their national competition 
policies as these practices encourage 
the exercise of market power by their 
domestic exporting firms,27 and they 
viewed export cartels as an instrument 
of strategic trade policy. Furthermore, 
                                                          
24 Jurgita Bruneckienė and others, The Impact of Cartels on National Economy and Competitiveness 
(A Lithuanian Case Study, Springer 2015) 1-47. 
25 Michael Ristaniemi, 'Export Cartels and the Case for Global Welfare' Global Antitrust Review 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3166228> accessed 11 March 2020. Also see Christian Schultz, 
'Export Cartels and Domestic Markets' (2002) 2 Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 233. 
26 John Sanghyun Lee, Strategies to Achieve a Binding International Agreement on Regulating Cartels 
(Springer 2016) 253-323. 
27 Frederic Desmarais, 'Export Cartels in the Americas and the OAS: Is the Harmonization of 
National Competition Laws the Solution?' (2009) 33 (1) Manitoba Law Journal 41, 48. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Frederic M Scherer, Competition Policies For an Integrated World Economy (Brookings Institution 
Press 1994) 43. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Arijit Mukherjee and Uday Bhanu Sinha, 'Export Cartel and Consumer Welfare' (2019) 27 (1) 
Review of International Economics 91. 
a national government exempting 
export cartels from the policy in its 
territory aims to gain supra-normal 
profits in international markets.28 
A rationale for export cartels to be 
exempted from domestic competition 
law is because it may facilitate 
cooperative penetration of foreign 
markets. This will transfer welfare from 
foreign consumers to domestic firms 
and result in a balance of trade. 
Scherer highlights a range of possible 
cartel situations.29 Domestic 
producers may collaborate with foreign 
producers in international cartels. 
Sometimes, these cartels are engaged 
in market sharing, in which the cartels 
affect international trade relations as 
well as facilitating monopoly pricing by 
engaging in output restrictions30. 
Virtually, the majority of 
countries exempt export cartels from 
their competition policy because export 
cartels contribute to the national 
economy positively, as they extract 
surplus from foreign consumers and 
transfer it into the profits of home-
based companies.31 For instance, 
Taiwan and Japan allow import cartels 
although the enforcement is restricted. 
Both countries, as well as South Korea, 
exempted cartels from their laws.  
The Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) can 
authorize an exemption  if  it  is  found 
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that there is a potential benefit that 
outweighs the potential harm. The 
annual authorizations for export 
cartels have declined from a peak of 69 
in 1975 to just 4 in 2002. As of 1997, 
the ACCC reported that it had received 
400 export agreement notifications.32 
The competition policy 
arrangement between Japan and the 
US faced difficulty when the two 
countries had different views on export 
cartels.33 The law in Japan authorized 
legal officers to enforce cartel 
agreements, while cartel agreements 
were legalized under the Webb-
Pomrene Export Trade Act of 1918 in 
the US. However, the US courts did not 
enforce these agreements, resulting in 
the cartels were obliged to provide the 
enforcement mechanism themselves.34 
In other cases, countries engaged 
in economic integration or cooperation 
may exclude export cartels from their 
competition law. In 2004, a study by 
Levenstein and Suslow surveyed 56 
countries, of which 17 offered 
exporters an exemption from national 
competition laws;35 the rest provided 
no exemption from regulation for 
export cartels, but rather exempted 
them implicitly. Levenstein and Suslow 
argued that countries with an implicit 
exemption of export cartels stated that 
                                                          
32 Margaret C Levenstein and Valerie Y Suslow, 'The Changing International Status of Export Cartel 
Exemptions' (2004) 20 (4) American University International Law Review 785, 791. 
33 Mitsuo Matsushita, 'Export Control and Export Cartels in Japan' (1979) 20 (1) Harvard 
International Law Journal 103. Export control laws allowing the formation of export cartels are 
one of the primary tools available to the Japanese government and Japanese industry for 
adjusting exports in an attempt to respond to increased scrutiny of imports by foreign countries. 
34 Schultz,  'Export Cartels and Domestic Markets' (n 25). 
35 Levenstein and Suslow, 'The Changing International Status of Export Cartel Exemptions' (n 32). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 UNCTAD, 'Competition Policy and Vertical Restraints: Note/ by the UNCTAD Secretariat.' 
(UNCTAD, 1999) 1 <https://unctad.org/en/Docs/poitcdclpm8.en.pdf> accessed 19 December  
2019.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Ross Jones, 'Economic Integration and Competition Policy: The Agenda for APEC' in Christos 
Paraskevopoulos, Theodore Georgakopoulos and Leo Micheles (eds), The Asymmetric Global 
Economy: Growth, Investment and Public Policy (AFP Press 2000). 
their national laws were silent on 
restrictive activities that affect foreign 
markets.36 Further, Levenstein and 
Suslow argued that the structure of 
national competition laws only 
restricts activity that harms domestic 
competition. It leaves a vacuum in 
which export cartels can operate 
without any obvious institution to 
restrict their anti-competitive 
activities. To avoid this, it is necessary 
to have international cooperation on 
export cartel agreements.37 
Vertical Restraint Assessments 
Vertical restraints refer to a broad 
range of arrangements between 
independent firms linked to each other 
in a buyer-seller relationship.38 These 
arrangements are seen as extremely 
anti-competitive conduct, intended to 
build entry barriers against competing 
products and to gain profit-maximizing 
margins.39 Competition policy on 
vertical arrangements varies 
considerably between countries. One of 
the major difficulties in developing a 
consistent policy is that economists 
disagree on the extent of the 
anticompetitive effects of vertical 
arrangement.40 
Until the mid-1980s, economists 
saw vertical restraints were unlikely to 
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restrict41 since there was no prime 
evidence that any restraint improved or 
reduced economic efficiency.42 
However, there is now considerable 
debate among economists as to the 
anti-competitive impact of vertical 
arrangements.43 The literature lacks 
consistency, with some economists 
concluding that vertical restrictions 
have the potential for both pro-
competitive and anti-competitive 
effects.44 In some cases, particularly in 
manufacturing industries, vertical 
foreclosure is beneficial.45 
Vertical restraints can help intra-
brand coordination in several ways.46 
For example, by giving the 
manufacturer direct control over 
distributors’ actions or giving the 
manufacturer the right to specify retail 
services or prices. These restrictions 
can also be used to restructure 
incentives. For example, a two-part 
tariff, combining a fixed fee and a price 
equal to marginal cost, leads a 
distributor to gain aggregate profits. 
These restraints may be helpful when 
there are spillover effects among 
distributors. Granting exclusive 
territories can help solve the problem 
of free-riding in retail services.47 
                                                          
41 Ibid. 
42 William S Comanor and Patrick Rey, 'Competition Policy Towards Vertical Restraints in Europe 
and The United States' (1997) 24 Empirica 37, 38. 
43 Richard A Posner, 'Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy' (2005) 75 (1) The University of Chicago 
Law Review 229. 
44 Dennis W Carlton and Jeffrey M Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization (Pearson Higher Ed 2015) 
522-523.  
45 William H Rooney, Timothy G Fleming and Sruti Swaminathan, 'Amex in Context: Tracing the 
Application of the Rule of Reason to Vertical Restraints' (2019) Columbia Business Law Review 
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/colb2019&div=4&id=&page> 
accessed December 20, 2019. 
46 Comanor and Rey, 'Competition Policy Towards Vertical Restraints in Europe and the United 
States'(n 42) 47. 
47 Ibid, 37-38. 




51 Paolo Buccirossi, 'Vertical Restraints on E-commerce and Selective Distribution' (2015) 11 (3) 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 747, 747-773. Also see Gerald Brock, 'Industrial Cases' 
(1989) 19 Journal of Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics 385, 386-387. 
Several models have been 
constructed to explain how 
manufacturers benefit from vertical 
restraints.48 The first explanation is 
that these restraints may facilitate 
cartel behavior among either 
manufacturers or distributors. Where 
this role can be demonstrated, there is 
broad agreement that vertical 
restraints promote anti-competitive 
results and should be prohibited.49 
Conversely, vertical restraints 
can also affect inter-brand 
competition.50 These practices can 
reduce competition among existing 
suppliers by sustaining collusive 
behavior and by maintaining 
downstream cartels. In the long run, 
these restraints can also reduce 
market competition to block 
competitors or build entry barriers. 
Further, manufacturers were able to 
impose restrictive contracts, despite 
increasing competition.51 
The first reason is that most 
distributors were connected to a 
specific manufacturer by considerable 
investment in brand-specific 
equipment and by their customers’ 
loyalty to the manufacturer’s welding 
equipment.   These   linkage  networks 
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created high costs to distributors of 
switching gas suppliers entirely. The 
result is the distributors cannot refuse 
the restrictive agreement if the 
alternative would be a significant loss 
of customers and compensated only by 
a small cost reduction for a few of the 
gasses they sell.52 Second, the 
distributors were moderate in seeing 
the elevated rivalry at the 
manufacturing level. At the previous 
low level of price competition in gasses, 
the prohibitive contracts would have 
merely formalized a linkage that 
business realities already generally 
directed.53 
To assess vertical restraints, 
whether they harm competition, some 
countries use a different approach. 
There is diversity in the application of 
the approach based on whether or not 
it is assumed that vertical restraints 
have an economic impact.54 In 
particular circumstances, vertical 
restraints have a positive effect on 
firms, where vertical agreements lead 
to increased sales and cut distribution 
costs. Hence, it will give rise to the 
most efficient result. However, vertical 
restraints also have an adverse 
economic impact. Firms may not 
always gain efficiency from vertical 
restraints. They may lead to a 
reduction in consumer welfare 
overall.55 
                                                          
52 Ronald N Lafferty, Robert H Lande and John B Kirkwood (eds), Impact Evaluations of Federal 
Trade Commission Vertical Restraints Cases (Federal Trade Commission 1984) 55. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 777-781. 
55 William S Comanor, 'Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and The New Antitrust 
Policy' 98 (5) Harvard Law Review 983, 985-987. 
56 UNCTAD, 'The Use of Economic Analysis in Competition Cases: Study / by the UNCTAD 
Secretariat' (UNCTAD Secretariat, 2009) 12 <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/653822> 
accessed 20 December 2019.  
57 Wolfgang Kerber and Simonetta Vezzoso, 'EU Competition Policy, Vertical Restraints, and 
Innovation an Analysis from an Evolutionary Perspective' (10th International Society Conference 
Milan/Italy, 9-12 June 2004).  
58 UNCTAD, 'The Use of Economic Analysis in Competition Cases: Study/by the UNCTAD 
Secretariat' (n 56). 
In 1999, UNCTAD released a 
report regarding competition policy 
and vertical restraints. It showed that 
there is a difference in how vertical 
restraints a reassessed that may bring 
about a different result.56 This is 
illustrated in the cases of the EU and 
APEC in vertical restraints of 
assessment.  
Before 1999, Article 81(1) of the 
EC Treaty provided the method to 
evaluate vertical restraints which 
referred to Block Exemption 
Regulations. The Regulations were 
divided into three parts: black, white, 
and grey. Each of them excluded 
similar agreements whose pro-
competitive benefits are considered to 
outweigh their anti-competitive 
effects.57 The blacklist provision 
contained prohibitions against vertical 
agreement unless vetted through an 
onerous individual exemption 
procedure; the prohibitions on the 
white list were exempted under a block 
exemption, and the procedures in the 
grey list contained the block exempted 
agreements.58 
Vertical restrictions were 
excluded from the Block Exemption 
Regulations. In that case, all four 
criteria of Article 81(3) have to 
examine: (1) the positive efficiency 
effects must outweigh the anti-
competitive ones; (2) customers should 
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have a fair share of the efficiency gains; 
(3) the vertical restrictions must be 
indispensable for the attainment of 
these efficiencies; and (4) competition 
must not be lessened; firms are not 
allowed to become dominant as a 
consequence of the vertical agreement. 
This shows that competition analysis 
of vertical restraints under Article 81 is 
focused on the efficiencies and the 
ascertainment of possible indicators of 
market power, such as the market 
position of the supplier and 
competitors, and the presence of entry 
barriers.59 
In the US, vertical restraints 
policies have been sharply varied for 
more than 30 years. Most of the US 
policies on vertical restraints are set by 
judicial decisions, but courts can only 
rule on cases brought before them.60 
Exclusive dealing and tie-ins are 
subject to a competition test under US 
law such that they are illegal if the 
result is to lessen competition. There 
are no specific anti-competitive tests 
concerning other vertical behaviors, 
such as third line forcing or territorial 
restrictions.61 It was only in 1967 that 
the Supreme Court ruled that vertical 
non-prices, as well as price restraints, 
were confirmed per se illegal. 
Subsequently, standards became far 
more lenient; vertical non-price 
restraints were to be evaluated by 
using the rule of reason approach.62 
                                                          
59 Kerber and Vezzoso, 'EU Competition Policy, Vertical Restraints, and Innovation An Analysis from 
an Evolutionary Perspective'(n 57) 4-5. 




63 Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (n 54) 1129. 
64 UNCTAD, 'Cross-border Anticompetitive Practices: The Challenges for Developing Countries and 
Economies in Transition' (UNCTAD, 2012) 3 <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/ 726411> 
accessed 20 December 2019. 
Cross-Border Merger Assessment: 
Market Power v Dominance 
Merger and Acquisition M&As 
have various consequences for 
performance. Cross-border mergers 
often require the approval of both the 
acquiring and target firm’s 
shareholders, and the acquiring 
company assumes the target’s assets 
and liabilities. While in the cross-
border acquisition, the control of 
assets and operations is transferred 
from a local to a foreign company, with 
the former becoming an affiliate of the 
latter.  
The purpose of M&A control is to 
enable competition authorities to 
regulate changes in market structure 
by making decisions as to whether two 
or more firms may merge, combine, or 
consolidate their companies into one.63 
UNCTAD reported that cross-border 
mergers may result in anti-competitive 
conduct. It is important to eliminate 
the anticompetitive effects of cross-
border mergers; the adverse effects of 
cross-border mergers have a 
considerable impact on economies by 
changing the structure of the relevant 
market, thereby increasing exposure to 
anti-competitive practices.64 
In this regard, the term cross-
border merger refers to mergers that 
involve firms established in more than 
one jurisdiction or that affect markets 
in more than one jurisdiction. Thus, 
cross-border mergers may directly 
involve local businesses or may involve 
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foreign transnational companies, but 
in the end, it changed to the market of 
a third country.65 
The most significant existing 
merger regimes are the US and EU, 
since the US merger regime has had an 
impact on the EU industry, and vice 
versa. From the early 1940s until the 
late 1970s, US anti-competitive rules 
via antitrust agencies, along with 
private parties in private litigation, 
aggressively enforced US antitrust law 
against firms outside the US 
jurisdiction and those whose business 
activities were intended for the US 
market.66 The enormous gap in control 
between the US and EU regimes brings 
a high impact on other jurisdictions. 
Bergman et al. argued that both 
merger controls may also affect the rest 
of the world.67 Although global 
companies need to be concerned about 
competition rules everywhere, their 
biggest problems lie with the US and 
the EU.68 
There are significant differences 
in the practical analysis of mergers in 
both jurisdictions.69 The US’s style of 
unilateral effects analysis is not carried 
                                                          
65 Ibid., 13. 
66 John J Parisi, 'Cooperation Among Competition Authorities in Merger Regulation' (2010) 43 
Cornell International Law Journal 55, 57. 
67 Mats A Bergman and others, 'Merger Control in the European Union and the United States: Just 
the Facts' (2011) 7 (1) European Competition Journal 89. 
68 David S Evans, 'The New Trustbusters: Brussels and Washington May Part Ways' (2002) 81 
Foreign Affairs 14, 15.  
69 Lorenzo Coppi and Mike Walker, 'Substantial Convergence or Parallel Paths-Similarities and 
Differences in the Economic Analysis of Horizontal Mergers in the US and EU Competition Law' 
(2004) 49 (1-2) Antitrust Bulletin 101, 103. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Gunnar Niels and Adriaan Ten Kate, 'Introduction: Antitrust in the US and the EU-Converging 
or Diverging Paths' (2004) 49 (1-2) Antitrust Bulletin 1, 2. 
72 Coppi and Walker, 'Substantial Convergence or Parallel Paths-Similarities and Differences in the 
Economic Analysis of Horizontal Mergers in the US and EU Competition Law' (n 69) 125.  
73 Generally, economists agreed that mergers are usually pro-competitive such as enhance 
consumer welfare because they allow the methods of production to be reorganized and 
inefficiencies to be removed, thereby creating more efficient firms. Consumers benefit if prices 
are reduced as costs go down. However, not all mergers are benign, because the structural 
changes may significantly enhance the market power of the firms in the affected market. Bergman 
and others, 'Merger control in the European Union and the United States: Just the Facts' (n 67).  
74 Coppi and Walker, 'Substantial Convergence or Parallel Paths-Similarities and Differences in the 
Economic Analysis of Horizontal Mergers in the US and EU Competition Law' (n 69). 
out in the EU jurisdiction. Indeed, the 
overall focus of the investigation of the 
merger analysis is strictly different.70 
Niels and Kate gave more specific 
points of view on significant differences 
that exist in the legal and economic 
standards between different 
competition law jurisdictions, 
particularly the US and the EU. Having 
been brought to light, these differences 
have generated a great deal of 
controversy and debate in recent years, 
most notably in high-profile cases such 
as Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (1997) 
and GE/Honeywell (2001).71 Coppi and 
Walker clarified the peculiarity of both 
regimes, finding that the US merger 
control emphasizes unilateral effect, 
while the EU analyses the effects of the 
M&S based on the collective 
dominance of firms.72 
In assessing whether trans-
border mergers have adverse effects on 
competition and consumer welfare,73 
market power and market dominance 
remain essential elements in merger 
analysis.74 However, there was debate 
among experts regarding the use of 
substantive      tests    versus    market 
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dominance tests.75 The substantive 
analysis focuses on the effects of 
market power whether implicit or 
explicit. In this regard, the market 
definition is less significant for the 
dominance test in the US merger 
control regime.76 This approach has 
been used by several countries 
worldwide, including the US,77 
Canada, New Zealand, France, Ireland, 
South Africa, and the United 
Kingdom.78 
The US test for a merger is based 
on whether it is likely to result in a 
significant lessening of competition as 
subjected to Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act. Generally, the US agencies 
focused on the assessment of market 
concentration after a merger was 
established by using the HHI index.79 
When using the index, FTC considers 
both after the merger level of the HHI 
and the increase of market 
concentration resulting from the 
merger.  
                                                          
75 Julie N Clarke, 'Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Review Procedures-A Better Way' (2006) 14 (2) Trade 
Practices Law Journal 90. 
76 Coppi and Walker, 'Substantial Convergence or Parallel Paths-Similarities and Differences in the 
Economic Analysis of Horizontal Mergers in the US and EU Competition Law' (n 69), 104-105. In 
general, the more narrow the market is defined the more likely firms will be found to have market 
power. See Patrick Massey, 'Market Definition and Market Power in Competition Analysis: Some 
Practical Issues' (2000) 31 (4) The Economic and Social Review 309, 310. Furthermore, in the US 
there is a general trend toward reduced reliance on market definition since the utilization of 
unilateral effect theories.   
77 Bergman and others, 'Merger control in the European Union and the United States: Just the 
Facts' (n 67).  
78 Clarke, 'Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Review Procedures-A Better Way' (n 75). 
79 Suppose there are ten firms in a market in which each has a 10% market share, the HHI would 
be (10)2 + (10)2 +....+ (10)2 =1,000. By contrast, a market with one firm that has a 50% share 
and five firms each with a 10% share would have an HHI of (50)2 + (10)2 +(10)2 +….(10)2 =3,000. 
The HHI ranges from 10,000 (in the case of a pure monopoly) to a number approaching zero (in 
the case of an atomistic market). SeeFred H Hays and Sidne Gail Ward, 'Understanding Market 
Concentration: Internet-Based Applications from the Banking Industry' Journal of Instructional 
Pedagogies 1, 2 <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1096952> accessed 20 December 2019. 
80 For example, the merger of firms with shares of five percent and ten percent of the market would 
increase the HHI by 100 (5 × 10 × 2 = 100). See the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines 2010 at 
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 'Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
2010' (USDOJ, 2010) 19 <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html> 
accessed 8 June 2019. 
81 Ibid., Section 5.3, 20.  
82 Stephen A Rhoades, 'Market Share Inequality, the HHI, and Other Measures of the Firm-
Composition of a Market' (1995) 10 Review of Industrial Organization 657. 
83 Jacob A Bikker and Michiel van Leuvensteijn, A New Measure of Competition in the Financial 
Industry: The Performance-conduct-structure Indicator (Routledge 2014) 84. 
The increase in the HHI can be 
indicated by the amount of market 
share product of the merging firms, 
particularly when it shows double after 
the merger.80 The Agencies classify 
markets into three types:81 
a) Unconcentrated markets: HHI 
below 1500. 
b) Moderately concentrated 
markets: HHI between 1500 and 
2500. 
c) Highly concentrated markets: 
HHI above 2500. 
The index is necessary as it 
reflects the concentration of firms’ 
output.82 The HHI index is essential 
because it has characteristics of being 
correlated with the level of industry-
wide profits based on the Cournot 
model of competition.83 In the Cournot 
model of competition, there is a strong 
relationship between market power 
and level of industry  profits  to  overall 
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concentration as measured by the 
HHI.84 
Conversely, the second method 
other than the HHI prohibits mergers 
when they create or enhance a position 
of dominance in the relevant market. 
The EU used this method before the 
latest merger regulation of 2004.85 In 
1990, the EU adopted the EU Merger 
Regulation. This regulation prohibited 
mergers that strengthen a dominant 
position as a result of which effective 
competition would be significantly 
lessened.86 The Merger Regulation was 
aimed at permitting effective control of 
all concentrations from their effect on 
the structure of competition in the 
Community and to be the only 
instrument applicable to such 
concentrations.87 
In the European experience, since 
the establishment of the European 
Economic Community, the wave of 
mergers has increased to a significant 
level. Merger policy was not explicitly 
dealt with in the Treaty of Rome in 
1957. Rather, it has traditionally been 
guided by a comprehensive 
interpretation of Articles 85 and 86 of 
the Treaty. More recently, however, a 
new regulation was approved as an 
attempt at creating the basis for an 
EU-wide merger policy.88 
                                                          
84 Toby Roberts, 'When Bigger is Better: A Critique of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index's use to 
Evaluate Mergers in Network Industries' (2014) 34 (2) Pace Law Review 1. 
85 Lars-Hendrik Röller and Miguel De La Mano, 'The Impact of the New Substantive Test in 
European Merger Control' (2006) 2 (1) European Competition Journal 9. 
86 Ibid., 10. 
87 Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (EC 
Merger Regulation) (2004) OJ L24/29.1.2004 P 1-22.  
88 Council Regulation (EC) 4064/1989 on the control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (EC 
Merger Regulation) [1989] OJ L 257/90 P 13 has been substantially amended. 
89 Alexis Jacquemin, 'Horizontal Concentration and European Merger Policy' (1990) 34 92-3) 
European Economic Review 539. Pedro P. Barros, 'Merger Policy in Open Economies' (1994) 38 
(5) European Economic Review 1041, 1047-1048.  
90 Barros, 'Merger Policy in Open Economies' (n 89). 
91 Jacquemin, 'Horizontal Concentration and European Merger Policy' (n 89) 544. 
92 Eleanor Morgan and Steven McGuire, 'Transatlantic Divergence: GE–Honeywell and the EU's 
Merger Policy' (2004) 11 (1) Journal of European Public Policy 39-56. Also, see David J Gerber, 
'The European Commission's GE/Honeywell Decision: US Responses and Their Implications' 
(2003) Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht [Journal of Competition Law] 87.  
According to Jacquemin, the 
existing data reflects that the sum of 
M&As involving at least one of the top 
1,000 EU firms has been steadily 
developing with positive progress,89 
increasing from 185 in 1984–1985 to 
492 in 1988–1989. Among these top 
1,000 firms, companies with sales of 
over 1 billion (based on European 
currency) were involved in 75% of 
mergers in 1988–1989, compared to 
50% in 1984–1985.90 The market 
shares of the merging firms were too 
large and threatened consumer 
welfare. The logical reason is the more 
power the merging firms hold before 
the merger, the larger the cost 
reduction has to be for the after-merger 
price to fall.91 
In the GE-Honeywell merger case, 
the center of the conflict between two 
competition policy systems was that 
each used a different theory. The US 
expressed disagreement with the EU’s 
decision, pointing out the different 
methods used to evaluate the impact of 
the merger, yielding different results.92 
The EU applied the range effect theory 
and the entrenchment doctrine to 
assess the merger of GE-Honeywell. 
Under both theories, the merger could 
be condemned if it strengthened an 
already dominant firm through greater 
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efficiencies or gave acquired firm 
access to a broader line of products or 
greater financial resources, thus 
making business more difficult for 
small firms. For that reason, the US 
eliminated the use of these theories for 
examining non-horizontal mergers. 
Also, these theories are no longer used 
because empirical evidence could not 
show that this would harm the 
competition.93 
In the EU itself, the enforcement 
of the Old Regulation raised important 
question due to it resulting in different 
interpretations. Therefore, a lot of 
changes were made in its performance. 
One alternative interpretation 
articulated that market concentration 
is forbidden whenever it leads to the 
creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position and if the effect of 
such change in the market structure 
amounts to a significant barrier to 
competition.94 
In this case, dominance is quite 
necessary but not sufficient to prove 
the negative impact of the merger in 
the relevant market. The second 
alternative interpretation is that 
mergers that create or strengthen a 
dominant position will automatically 
harm competition.95 The opponents of 
this analysis argue that dominance is 
both necessary and enough and 
constitutes a single condition.96 
                                                          
93 Ricky D Rivers, 'General Electric/Honeywell Merger: European Commission Antitrust Decision 
Strikes a Sour Note' (2002) 9 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 525, 528. 
94 Röller and De La Mano, 'The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger Control' (n 
85)  9. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., 11. 
97 Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (EC 
Merger Regulation)' [2004] OJ L24/29.1.2004 P 1-22. 
98 Bergman and others, 'Merger control in the European Union and the United States: Just the 
Facts' (n 67).  
99 Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (EC 
Merger Regulation [2004] OJ L24/29.1.2004 P 1-22. 
100 Adél Németh and Hans-Martin Niemeier, 'Airline Mergers in Europe–An Overview on the Market 
Definition of the EU Commission' (2012) 22 Journal of Air Transport Management 45, 48. 
To overcome these multiple 
interpretations of the substantive test, 
the EU adopted the 2004 New Merger 
Regulation and reformulated the 
substantive tester of the SIEC test as 
follows: 
A concentration that would 
significantly impede effective 
competition, in particular by the 
creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position, in the common 
market or a substantial part of it 
shall be declared incompatible with 
the common market.97 
The 2004 changed merger 
regulations had a similar methodology 
to those in the US, introducing a multi-
firm unilateral effect, along with an 
efficiency defense and the use of a 
hypothetical monopoly test to define 
the market.98 According to the 2004 
Regulation, concentration is to be 
welcomed if it is not damaging to 
competition, but rather increases the 
competitiveness of the entire European 
industry and raises living standards.99 
It should maintain and develop 
effective competition. The resulting 
expansion of technical and economic 
progress should benefit the 
consumer's welfare.100 
However, the dominance test 
standard under the 2004 Regulation is 
differently worded from the US  merger 
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regimes.101 In contrast to the US 
definition of dominance, the EU defines 
dominance as a position of economic 
strength enjoyed by a firm that enables 
it to prevent its competitors from 
entering into the market so that 
effective competition cannot be 
maintained on the relevant market.102 
By affording its power, a firm also 
abuses its power to control the price. 
Dominance in this perspective remains 
the core principle of Article 2 of the 
Merger Regulation. The new SIEC test 
does not require the presence of 
dominance as the prerequisite to 
defining market power, based on the 
reason that if dominance is properly 
accepted as significant market power, 
then there is no reason for market 
leadership to be necessary for a 
dominant position.103 
In dealing with anti-competitive 
conduct, some cooperation agreements 
were established, including the 
international measures provided for in 
the Set of Multilaterally Agreed 
Equitable Principles and Rules for the 
Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices negotiated under the 
auspices of UNCTAD. Another 
international measure is the OECD 
                                                          
101 Nicholas Levy, 'EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence' (2003) 26 (2) World Competition 
195, 200.  
102 Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (n 54) 284. 
103 Röller and De La Mano, 'The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger Control' (n 
85) 15. 
104 OECD, 'The Standard For Merger Review' (OECD, 2009) 8 <http://search.oecd.org/ 
daf/competition/mergers/45247537.pdf> accessed 13 December 2019. Also, see Roman Inderst 
and Nicola Mazzarotto, 'Can the SIEC Test Be Used to Assess Effects from Buyer Power?' (2017) 
8 (3) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 185. 
105 Ki Jong Lee, 'Culture and Competition: National and Regional Levels' (2008) 21 (1) Loyola 
Consumer Law Review 33. 
106 Aldaba, Emerging Issues in Promoting Competition Policy in the APEC and ASEAN Countries (n 
23) 1-10. 
107    Kim Them Do, 'Competition Law and Policy and Economic Development in Developing Countries' 
(2011) 8 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 18, 19. Also see Kim Them Do, 'The 
Perspectives of International Cooperation in Competition Law and Policy' (2009) 3 Zeitschriftt fir 
Wettbewerbsrecht (ZWeR) Journal of Competition Law 298, 303. 
108 Roger Cotterrell, ‘Law in Culture’ (2004) 17 (1) Ratio Juris 1. 
109 Lawrence M. Friedman, 'Legal Culture and Social Development' (1969) 4 (1) Law & Society Review 
29, 34.  
Recommendation on Merger Review 
2005, which stresses the importance of 
cooperation and coordination in 
reviewing transnational mergers.104 
Legal Culture 
Differences in national legal 
cultures may affect competition law in 
regional cooperation.105 Differences in 
legal culture in member states in a 
regional trade agreement also enhance 
the obstacles to the enforcement of 
competition law.106 Kim Them Do107 
mentioned in a study that different 
legal cultures may create crucial 
obstacles to economic integration. The 
culture and the social conditions of a 
country affect its enforcement of the 
law; Cotterel observed this as the 
relationship of culture to the 
application of the law.108 Similarly, 
Lawrence Friedman argued that 
culture is another significant element 
that defines a legal system in one 
country, after legal substance and legal 
structure such as procedural law and 
court decisions.109 He further added 
that ‘the culture relates to the values 
and attitudes that link the system 
together and that determine the place 
of the legal system in the culture of the 
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society as a whole’.110 Without 
understanding the culture of a 
country, it would be difficult to design 
a law regime for them to adopt. 
Ultimately, implementing 
transnational competition law would 
not be simple because cultural barriers 
or issues should be understood in the 
context of the member states 
themselves.111 
In Japan, for instance, there is a 
cultural barrier to accepting new 
competition owing to the great success 
of the prevailing competition culture, 
which has influenced economic 
stability.112 Cultural differences have 
played a role even within the EU 
economic community, where the 
strength of the competition culture of 
member states varies. For example, the 
UK and Ireland are developing a firmer 
competition culture, with strong 
criminal enforcement against cartels, 
whereas most other members seem to 
waver in this regard.113 
In 2002, the OECD reported 
penalizing hard-core cartels in several 
countries, and that the process of 
doing so was influenced by the culture 
of each country.114 Of these 
countries—Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Slovak, 
Spain, and the US—only nine provided 
for criminal sanctions, such as 
imprisonment, for those involved in 
                                                          
110 Ibid. 
111 OECD, 'Challenges/Obstacles Faced by Competition Authorities in Achieving Greater Economic 
Development through the Promotion of Competition' (n 17).  
112 Lee, 'Culture and Competition: National and Regional Levels' (n 105).  
113 Ibid. 
114 OECD, 'Fighting Hard Core Cartels: Harm, Effective Sanctions and Leniency Programmes' (OECD, 
2002) <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264174993-en> accessed 13 December  2019.  
115 Ibid. 
116 Paul Gorecki, 'Competition Policy in Ireland: A Good Recession?' (2012) ESRI Working Paper 
1/2012 1-26 <http://www.tara.tcd.ie/xmlui/handle/2262/63752> accessed 19 December 
2019. 
117 Lee, 'Culture and Competition: National and Regional Levels' (n 105)39. 
118 Ibid.  
anti-competitive conduct. The nine 
countries were Canada, Germany, 
Ireland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, 
the Slovak Republic, and the US.115 
Canada and the US are also known for 
meting out goal punishment to 
executives who become involved with 
cartels. UK and Ireland also imposed 
criminal sanctions on executives for 
cartel activity.116 
There is a reasonable explanation 
as to why legal implementation could 
vary according to culture.117 First, 
nations with individualistic values 
have more severe anti-cartel policies 
than those with collective cultures; 
second, nations with a stronger 
tendency to avoid uncertainty are 
inclined to have a relatively lenient 
anti-cartel instrument. Third, 
countries that show the mixed cultural 
values, tend to have a more rigorous 
anti-cartel policy; and fourth, cluster 
countries such as Canada and the 
United Kingdom, tend to have a less 
rigorous anti-cartel policy.118 Cartels 
are deemed a direct restraint against 
competition law; Lee opines that a 
lenient anti-cartel policy indicates a 
fairly weak competition culture, while 
a rigorous anti-cartel policy manifests 
in a stronger competition culture.  
There has also been debate 
regarding the connection between 
culture and harmonization of law in 
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the economic communities.119 For 
example, the EU facing an identity 
crisis in its process. Article 167 of the 
TFEU regulates the balance between 
contributing to member states’ 
cultures while respecting the national 
identity and moving the common 
European cultural heritage forward.120 
Accordingly, a broad interpretation of 
culture should be allowed in the 
context of harmonization so that 
cultural diversity covers, inter alia, 
legal as well as societal diversity.121 
However, in the context of ASEAN 
economic integration, the cultural 
identities of the member states, 
including their political and socio-
economic environments, are fragile 
issues.122 For sure, ASEAN will rely on 
the ‘deliberation' and 'consensus' 
principles to reach agreement on 
issues such as harmonizing ASEAN 
members’ competition laws into a 
regional system that respects cultural 
sensitivities and national 
sovereignty.123 Regardless of the 
competencies of the economic 
community member states, the 
importance of cooperation must be 
emphasized, since it requires the 
economic community to take cultural 
aspects into account in its action 
under the other provisions of 
regulations, particularly to respect and 
promote diversity. This implies that 
when the economic community sets 
out its process of harmonizing 
                                                          
119 Ruth Sefton-Green, 'Multiculturalism, Europhilia and Harmonization: Harmony or Disharmony' 
Utrecht Law Review <www.utrechtlawreview.org> accessed December 15, 2019 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ploykaew Porananond, Competition Law in the ASEAN Countries (Kluwer Law International BV 
2018). 
123 Wong, 'On Legal Harmonisation Within ASEAN' (n 12). This paper limits its analysis on the 
difficulties of harmonizing competition laws into the regional system, specifically on the market 
behavior and legal culture. The sovereignty of the ASEAN member states is beyond the paper 
discussion.   
124 Sefton-Green, 'Multiculturalism, Europhilia and Harmonization: Harmony or Disharmony' (n 
119). 
domestic laws, it must take cultural 
considerations into account.124 
CONCLUSION 
There is a reason why some 
regional economic communities delay 
or avoid the process of harmonization 
stem from the perception of different 
treatment to market behavior. Another 
obstacle is the problem of legal culture 
and the effect of the history of a nation 
on its competition policy and law. The 
central point regarding this obstacle is 
that ASEAN member states legal 
differences often stem from different 
cultures and social preferences. 
Specific rules are often suited to local 
traditions and customs, and even if 
harmonization enhances foreign trade 
opportunities among the member 
states, it may impose quite substantial 
short-run adaptation costs. 
Accordingly, the chance to harmonize 
different competition policies and laws 
in the ASEAN member states cannot be 
ultimately seen as an uncontroversial 
positive effort or one that is free of 
conflict. The increased integration of 
trade and national laws also creates 
fault-lines of cultural dissonance. 
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